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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the lower court err in failing to properly value

the assets of the partnership at the time of its dissolution?
2.

Did the lower court err in failing to properly

compute the liability of Plaintiff for the partnership debts?
3.

Did the lower court err in computing the amount of

rent to be debited against Plaintiff and, in the alternative,
did the lower court err in failing to exclude the rent for the
business premises and the rent of two base radio stations from
the obligation of Plaintiff when such claims were barred by
the doctrine of laches?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a dispute arising from an agreement entered into
between Plaintiff and Defendant for the purpose of engaging in
the sale and repair of electronic equipment.

Each party

claimed that the other party had breached the terms of the
agreement and was therefore liable for damages.
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW
This matter was tried to the Honorable Richard C. Davidson
on September 16, 1985.

The lower court subsequently entered

its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and awarded
approximately $11,000 to the defendant against the plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This lawsuit arose as a result of the business relationship
between plaintiff Robert Sather and defendant William Pitcher, Jr.
While it is undisputed that the two men had a business relationship for a number of years the extent of that relationship and
the contribution of each was hotly contested.

Because this

appeal is only concerned with limited issues, it is unnecessary
to go into extensive detail as to this relationship.

However,

a brief summary of the testimony of each side is useful in
understanding the decision of the lower court and the errors
now claimed by Appellant on this appeal.
TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANTS
Mr. William E. Pitcher, Jr. testified that he had known
the plaintiff Robert Sather for a number of years before he
began a business dealing with him in 1971.
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In April of that

year he became an employee for Mr. Sather in the repair of
radios and televisions and worked from the basement of Mrc
Satherfs jewelry store in Roosevelt, Utah.

(Tr. of September

16, 1985, p. 3 ) . According to Mr. Pitcher, during the first
six months of 19 72 it was decided that Mr. Pitcher would
become an equal partner with Mr. Sather in the electronic
and communication business and accordingly an agreement was
drawn up by Mr. Sather1s attorney Jim Hall outlining this
relationship.

(Tr. p. 6, 15).

Exhibit 2 is a document entitled "Agreement" which is
actually a carbon copy of the document prepared by Mr. Hall.
Pages 1 and 2 constitute the terms of the agreement but are
unsigned.

Page 3 is an extra page from a previous draft

which was used by the parties to add additional terms on the
backside of that page.

There are notations in blue ink and in

black ink on the reverse side of page 3.

(Ex. 2 ) . These

notations have also been initialed by both parties and while
the first page of the typed agreement is dated January 1, 1972
the written additions are dated July 1, 1972.
Mr. Pitcher explained that while originally he was to
receive a fixed percentage of the labor and parts used in
the electronics business that it was later decided that the two
men would become equal partners in the business.

Accordingly,

one of the notations contained on the back of page 3 stated
that paragraph 3 of the original agreement would be changed
to a "partnership".

According to Mr. Pitcher, this notation

which was written in black ink was added by him to other terms
-3-

written by Mr. Sather in blue ink.

Mr. Sather initialed page

3 to acknowledge this partnership relationship as well as the
other terms written in blue ink by Mr. Sather himself.

(Tr.

pp. 10-13).
For the convenience of this Court and the parties
Plaintiff has included a copy of the "Agreement" as a part
of the Addendum to this Brief.

The Agreement basically

requires plaintiff Sather to furnish a shop from which the
business could be conducted, to furnish necessary equipment
and inventory for the business, and to furnish a suitable
service truck for the business.

Defendant Pitcher agreed to

spend his full time and effort in the business and to operate
it in a good and workmanlike manner.

The parties agreed that

"at least monthly" an accounting shall be had both as to
labor and parts and that Pitcher would pay his own social
security, income tax, and workmensf compensation.

It was

also agreed that all the expenses of the business, rent,
utilities, taxes and other necessary business expenses would
be deducted before any division of profits.

Paragraph 8 provided

that Pitcher would have the option "during the term of this
Agreement to purchase the entire business" and that the purchase
price would be determined "on the basis of the cost of equipment,
less depreciation, plus all of the inventory of parts, tubes,
supplies, etc."

Finally, the agreement stated that it could

be terminated by either party at any time and that an accounting
would be given within three days after such termination.
(Ex. 2) .
-4-

During 1972 Mr. Pitcher worked in the basement of the
Sather jewelry store.

According to him he had about $1,200

worth of test equipment provided by Mr. Sather and about
$1,200 worth of inventory parts.

(Tr. pp. 20, 32). Because

the parties decided to expand the radio and television repair
service to the servicing and rental of two-way communication
equipment, it was necessary to buy additional test equipment
and to increase the inventory.

Accordingly, approximately

$7,000 for new equipment was purchased by the company using
Sather*s credit but paying it out of the company account.
(Tr. pp. 32-34).
In 19 73 equipment was leased from General Electric for
the purpose of transmitting mobile telephone conversations.
The equipment was erected on Blue Mountain by Mr. Pitcher and
the land was leased from the Bureau of Land Management by
Mr. Sather.

(Tr. pp. 21-22).

This repeater system which was

leased from General Electric and placed upon Blue Mountain
permitted two-way communication between the two base stations
(also leased from General Electric) contained at Mr. Satherfs
Vernal store and his Roosevelt store.

In addition, the

repeater system enabled two-way communication between mobile
telephone units owned by Mr. Sather as well as other companies
which were leased time on the system.

(Tr. pp.23-25).

Additional equipment was purchased from Motorola during 1973
for the use of the electronic business.

This equipment is

listed on Exhibit 4.
In 19 73 as well as in the following years all business
-5-

payments were made from the company account and the checks
were signed exclusively by Mr. Sather.

Whenever Mr. Pitcher

wanted a salary draw he would request it and Mr. Sather would
accordingly execute a check.

(Tr. p. 29). Payment for the

subsequently bought equipment as well as other expenses always
came from the company account.

(Tr. p. 34).

Because it was necessary to repair two-way radios in
the vehicles of customers it became very inconvenient to do
so when the vehicles could not be worked upon in the shop.
In December of 19 73, therefore, the company was relocated
from the jewelry store basement to a building approximately one
mile east of Roosevelt which was owned by the defendant.

The

building was, according to Mr. Pitcher, in good shape since it
had recently been remodeled.

Pitcher claimed that he paid for

these repairs himself and that Mr. Sather did not assist in
any way in upgrading his building.

As soon as the building

was prepared he moved all of the test equipment and inventory
into it in approximately January of 1974.

(Tr. p. 32).

Defendant produced an exhibit prepared by his bookkeeper
and daughter-in-law Verna Pitcher which he claimed summarized
the business operations of the company between 1973 and 19 78.
This summary showed an operating loss of $1,800 in 1973, a
profit of $430 in 1974, a profit of $1,500 in 1975, a profit
of $160 in 1976, a loss of $2,600 in 1977, and a loss of $7,400
in 19 78.

The exhibit also showed that while total sales in

19 73 were only approximately $10,500 they had grown to over
$38,000 in 1978.

(Ex. 5 ) . Defendant Pitcher stated that while
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he did not give Mr. Sather this type of accounting summary
each year he did provide him sufficient information so that
Sather could do his own income tax.

(Tr. p. 43).

In 1978, according to Pitcher, he became dissatisfied
with the business relationship between himself and Mr. Sather
and wanted to buy Mr. Sather out under the terms of the agreement.

Pitcher stated that Sather would not live up to his

part of the agreement and every time the witness wanted to do
something Sather would put his thumb down on it.

He offered

to give Sather $9,000 to buy him out but this offer was never
accepted.

(Tr. pp. 188-190) . Accordingly, in January of 1979

he formed his own company with his son.

(Tr. p. 188). He

changed the name of his business and opened a separate checking
account at a new bank.

He received a separate IRS and State

tax identification number and began paying all of his accounts
under his new business name.

(Tr. pp. 190-191).

At this time

all of the test equipment, communication equipment, and inventory
which was acquired during the Sather business relationship was
transferred into the new corporation.

(Tr. pp. 51-53).

Subsequently, Pitcher testified that when the lease for the
Blue Mountain facility came up for renewal that he changed it
over from the Sather Communication company to his own company.
The repeater equipment acquired during the Sather business
relationship,

still

remained on the mountain.

He did not

inform Mr. Sather of his intention to transfer this lease to
his own company.

(Tr. pp. 45-46, 54).

In 1981 defendant Pitcher related that he went to Mr.
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Sather's two jewelry stores and removed the two base stations
which were installed.

He did this because he figured the

equipment belonged to the business and since Mr. Sather was
not paying any rent on the equipment he believed he was
entitled to repossess it.

Later, he was served with a writ

of replevin concerning that equipment which began the present
lawsuit.

(Tr. pp. 192-193).

Pitcher claimed that Sather owed him approximately $20,000
from their business relationship which included the rental of
the base stations, the rental of his own building which Sather
was obligated to pay, as well as some miscellaneous charges
for electronic work performed for the jewelry store.

(Tr.

pp. 193-195).
TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE OF PLAINTIFFS
Plaintiff Robert Sather described the business relationship
between the two parties in an entirely different manner.

Mr.

Sather stated that it was never his intention on making Pitcher
a partner but that the two had agreed that Pitcher would receive
a percentage split for the work which he performed while employed
by Sather.

Mr. Sather explained that when he initialed the

"Agreement" (Ex. 2) that it did not contain the words "change
No. 3 to partnership" and that this language was subsequently
added in black ink after Sather had agreed to the other terms.
(Tr. p. 107). Sather stated that he would not be a partner
with a man who had several judgments against him and who could
not be responsible for credit.

(Tr. p. 117). It was partly

for this reason that Sather signed all the company checks from
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1973 through 1978.

(Tr. p. 117).

Sather maintained that there was over $6,500 in equipment
and inventory in 1971 when Pitcher began his employment.

(Tr.

p. 146). Sather acknowledged that Pitcher spent his sole
effort in the business between 1973 and 1978 but believed that
he had met his obligations under the agreement by supplying
the equipment, inventory, and other items which Pitcher would
have been unable to obtain on his own account.

(Tr. pp. 108-113,

128) .
Mr. Sather testified that he purchased materials for the
repair of Pitcher's building in which the company was later
located. (Tr. 115; Ex. 22). He further testified that he
frequently used his share of commissions from the sale of
equipment to fund necessary expenditures.

(Tr. p. 127). He

stated that during this period of time he never filed a
partnership tax return nor made any claims that he was in
partnership with Pitcher.

(Tr. p. 119).

He acknowledged that in 1978 Pitcher made an offer to
buy him out of the business but Mr. Sather stated that since
he was never given an opportunity to examine the company books
he had no idea what the value of the company was and therefore
refused any offer.

(Tr. p. 115). He stated that he never

had received an accounting from Pitcher during the entire
tenure of the relationship.

(Tr. p. 114). He testified that

he believed that Pitcher was a fair and honest person and
therefore did not want to bother him by asking him for the
accountings required by the agreement.
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On several occasions

he did receive brief summaries at the end of each year which
he then gave to his bookkeeper for tax purposes.

(Tr. p. 137) .

Sather stated that he never was formally notified by
Pitcher that the agreement had been terminated.

He was not

aware of it until the company bank account was closed by
Pitcher.

(Tr. p. 143). Later, Pitcher entered his stores

in Roosevelt

and Vernal and told the employees that the

equipment had to be repaired.

When Sather called Pitcher

several days later to find out about the status of the base
stations he was told by

Pitcher that he was going to keep the

machines since they belonged to the company and since Sather
had not paid rent on them.

(Tr. pp. 158-159).

Since Sather

felt that he had paid for these stations and that Pitcher
was not entitled to remove them he filed an action for replevin
in 1981.

(Tr. pp. 150-151).

He further testified that he

never authorized Mr. Pitcher to utilize the test equipment,
communication equipment, and inventory in Pitcherfs own electronics business.

He stated that he requested an accounting

from Mr. Pitcher prior to the time the lawsuit was initiated
but that it was never given.

(Tr. pp. 118-121).

In 1981 the

Internal Revenue Service levied on the plaintiff's bank account
and collected approximately $2,000 which was owing by the
company for the 1972-1978 period.

(Tr. p. 167).

Morris Casperson, a CPA employed by Mr. Sather, testified
that he had examined the original documents given to him by
Defendant and that his calculations showed that substantial
profits had been made in the business between 1973 and 19 78.
-10-

(Tr. pp. 97-98).
A one-day trial was held before the Honorable Richard C.
Davidson on September 16, 1985.

After listening to the testimony

the court ruled in favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiff.

A copy of the transcript relating to the court's

decision is contained in the Addendum. Subsequently, Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law together with a Judgment were
entered by the lower court. These documents are also included
in the Addendum.

It is from this Judgment that this appeal

is taken.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The lower court incorrectly assessed the value of

the assets at the time the "partnership" was dissolved.

The

court failed to follow established rules that the market value
of all property must be considered in assessing assets and
liabilities of partners in a dissolved partnership.

Since

there was substantial equipment remaining in the partnership
at the time of its dissolution Plaintiff was seriously prejudiced
by not being given credit for the existing market value of that
equipment.
2.

The lower court erred in incorrectly computing the

business losses for which Plaintiff was ultimately held liable.
There was no evidence to support the amount awarded by the
lower court nor did the lower court give Plaintiff credit for
the money he paid on behalf of the company to the Internal
Revenue Service.
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3.

The lower court failed to properly compute the

amount owing for the alleged rental of Defendant's building
since there is no evidence to justify the amount awarded.
In the alternative, the lower court should not have awarded
any amount of rent towards the building or towards the base
stations contained in Plaintiff's jewelry stores since the
doctrine of laches precludes Defendant from now asserting
these claims.
ARGUMENT
It was the position of the plaintiff in the lower court
that he had not entered into a partnership agreement with
defendant Pitcher.

Rather, Plaintiff maintained that Pitcher

was an employee who had agreed for a fixed percentage of the
business profits.

The lower court specifically rejected the

contentions of Plaintiff and found that a partnership agreement
had been created between the two parties and that each was
an equal partner of the other.

(Tr. pp. 214-216; 128-129).

Although Plaintiffs do not agree with the conclusion reached
by the lower court with regard to the partnership determination,
Plaintiffs recognize that the evidence was conflicting and
that on appeal credance must be given to the lower court's
judgment in those instances where there is sufficient evidence
to justify the lower court's ruling.

For this reason, therefore,

Plaintiffs do not contest in this appeal the finding of the
lower court that an equal partnership existed between the two
parties.
Assuming that there was a partnership agreement entered
-12-

into in 19 72 then the termination of this agreement by the
defendant in late 19 78 can only be termed as a dissolution
of partnership.

Accordingly, this action regardless of the

terminology used by the parties in the lower court must be
deemed an accounting of a defunct partnership entity.

As

such, this becomes a suit in equity rather than in law.
It is the responsibility of this Court, therefore, to review
both questions of fact and law as is mandated by the Utah
Constitution.

Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 9.

Even so, Plaintiffs recognize that this Court will review
questions generally in the light most favorable to the
findings of the trial court and will reverse only if the
evidence or lack of it renders it clearly necessary to do
so.

West v. West, 403 P.2d 22 (Utah 1965); Nepetco Associates

v. Jenkins, 669 P.2d 877 (Utah 1983).
Based upon the preceding principles Plaintiffs maintain
that the lower court erred in its valuation of the partnership
entity and erroneously awarded Defendants an amount to which
they were not entitled.
Essentially, Plaintiffs object to Findings of Fact Nos.
8, 9, 10 and 11 together with Conclusions of Law 4 and 5.
These objections will now be discussed in detail.
I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
ASSESS THE PARTNERSHIP ASSETS AS TO
THEIR MARKET VALUE AT THE TIME THE
PARTNERSHIP WAS DISSOLVED.

Finding No. 8 of the lower court stated:
When defendant terminated the business on
December 31, 1978, Plaintiff was entitled to
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receive one-half of the value of the assets at
that time. The assets of the partnership on
December 31, 197 8, included equipment which was
fully depreciated and had no value and inventory
of approximately $13,000. (Tr. pp. 129-130).
(Emphasis added).
It is undisputed that at the time the partnership terminated
in 1978 Defendant retained a substantial amount of testing as
well as communication equipment.

As previously noted in the

Statement of Facts, it was necessary for Defendant to substantially increase the amount of test equipment used in the business
during the five years of operation because of the expanded nature
of the business.

All of this testing equipment was paid for out

of the company account.

In addition, substantial equipment was

located on Blue Mountain for the purpose of transmitting two-way
communication signals.

This equipment which again was purchased

from the company account was later transferred into the name of
Defendant's company and produced income for the following years.
(Tr. pp. 175-180).
It is important to consider that this action was not
initiated by Defendant Pitcher against Sather for enforcement
of the partnership agreement.

Had Pitcher in 19 78 sought

specific performance of the partnership agreement and specifically paragraph 8 of that agreement relating to his option to
purchase,then the lower court would have been correct in
evaluating the assets as it did.

However, Pitcher chose instead

to terminate the agreement pursuant to paragraph 11 and to begin
his own separate company.
Thus, the term of the agreement had expired without Pitcher
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ever exercising his option to purchase the business on the
basis of the cost of the equipment less depreciation.

Instead,

Pitcher dissolved the partnership agreement and was then subject
to an accounting based upon normal partnership principles.
It is fundamental that an accounting must be based on the
market value of partnership assets at the time of dissolution.
Cave v. Cave, 474 P.2d 480 (N.M. 1970); 68 C.J.S., Partnership,
§387, p. 900-901.

Further, the value of the assets for purpose

of accounting is ordinarily determined as of the date of the
dissolution.

Id. at p. 901.

The finding of the lower court makes no sense in the context
of this case.

If, for example, the two parties in this case

had purchased a house in which defendant operated the business
and depreciated the house to a zero basis during the tenure of
the partnership, it could hardly be said that the house had no
value whatsoever and that the plaintiff should not be entitled
to receive a share of the value of that house.

In this case,

there is no question but that the equipment purchased by the
partnership still has substantial value and half of that value
should be credited to the plaintiffs.
In addition to the value of the equipment the lower court
should have also considered the value of the good will of the
partnership as well as any other valuation of an on-going
business.

68 C.J.S., Partnership, §396, p. 910.

The lower

court should hear evidence as to the typical ways in which a
business is valued at the time it is dissolved.
Because of this,

the case should be remanded to the
-15-

District Court for the purpose of conducting an evidentiary
hearing as to the market value of the

company

at the time

the dissolution occurred.
II.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS MATHEMATICAL
COMPUTATION OF PLAINTIFF'S OBLIGATION FOR
THE ALLEGED LOSS SUSTAINED BY THE BUSINESS.

The lower court at the conclusion of the trial made the
following statement from the bench:
It has also been testified to several times
Mr. Sather wanted to take these write-offs on his
tax return. For that reason I am also granting
judgment in the sum of $6,000 to the defendant for
the losses which Mr. Sather failed to pay but I am
confident took off on his own tax returns. (Tr.
p. 218).
The conclusion of the trial court that the plaintiff was liable
for $6,000 of business loss was converted to the following
language by Defendant's attorney in the signed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law:
At the time the partnership was terminated on
December 31, 1978, Plaintiff was also responsible
for one-half of the losses and debts of the partnership which losses included operating expenses during
the term of the partnership, tax liabilities, tax
benefits received by the plaintiff and not by the
defendant and interest for a total loss of at least
$12,000. (Tr. p. 130).
This finding is incorrect for several reasons.

First,

there is no evidence to justify the assessment of a $6,000 loss
to Plaintiff.

Mr. Pitcher himself testified that by his own

accounting sheet there was a total loss of $9,80 0.

(Tr. p. 56;

Ex. 5 ) . He further stated that this loss was partially covered
by not paying some of the obligations including the Internal
Revenue.

(Tr. pp. 56-57).

Thus, even completing disbelieving
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Plaintiff's evidence that a substantial profit had been made
in the business and completely believeing the evidence of
Defendant there at the most would be a loss of $9,800 at the
termination of the agreement.

Plaintiff would therefore only

be responsible for a maximum of $4,900 even applying these
figures.

However, part of this obligation included the unpaid

withholding taxes payable to the Internal Revenue.

Since it

is undisputed that Plaintiff was forced to pay approximately
$1,900 to the I.R.S. after his other bank accounts were attached
Plaintiff should have received a credit of $1,993 for his
expenditure.

At the most, therefore, Plaintiff would be liable

for a $2,900 existing business loss.
The remainder of the lower court's finding relating to
tax benefits is totally irrelevant.

Whether or not the plaintiff

received a tax benefit from claimed losses in the business is
a matter between him and the IRS and Defendant should in no case
receive a credit for any alleged improper claim on Plaintiff's
federal taxes.
A second reason why this finding is incorrect is simply
that the defendants never proved that the outstanding debts of
the company had been satisifed.

Since Defendants subsequently

filed bankruptcy after the operation of their own company it is
unknown whether these debts to which Plaintiff is now being
charged were ever in fact paid.

If they were not paid then

the obligation goes to the creditor and not to reimburse
Defendants for a debt which they did not sustain.
Finally, the lower court failed to take into account the
-17-

principle that a partnership obligation must be paid out of
firm assets before any partner is entitled to any part of the
assets or is liable for his proportionate share of any debt.
68 C.J.S., Partnership, §389, p. 902; West v. West, 403 P.2d
22, 25-26 (Utah 1965).
Had the assets of the partnership been liquidated at the
time of the dissolution as is legally required rather than
having the defendants unilaterally take possession of all
assets and immediately convert them to their own business, it
is probable that there would be no business debts or losses
for which the plaintiff would now be responsible.

Since this

was not done, however, the case should be remanded to the lower
court for an exact accounting as to what obligations remained
unpaid at the time of the dissolution and what obligations were
in fact paid by the defendants.

The lower court should also be

instructed to give to Plaintiff a credit for the Internal Revenue
debt which was paid by him.
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN COMPUTING
THE ALLEGED AMOUNT OWING BY PLAINTIFF
TO DEFENDANT FOR RENTAL OF DEFENDANT'S
BUILDING AND, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, LACHES
PRECLUDED DEFENDANTS FROM RAISING ANY
CLAIM AS TO THE RENTAL OF THE BUILDING
OR THE BASE RADIO STATIONS.
Findings No. 10 and 11 of the lower court found that a
reasonable rent for the building in which the business was
operated in after leaving the jewelry store basement was $200
a month for a total rental of $14,000.

In addition, the

court assessed the plaintiff with $6,600 for the rental of the
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two base radio stations which were utilized in the jewelry
stores of Plaintiff.

(Tr. p. 130).

Plaintiff does not believe it is proper to charge him
with any rental amount whatsoever as will be discussed infra.
However, even if such a charge is proper the mathematical
computation was incorrect.

Defendant Pitcher testified that

in December of 19 73 he moved the business operation from the
basement of the jewelry store to his building located one mile
east of Roosevelt.

(Tr. p. 31). He later testified that in

January of 1979 he began his own business operation at the
same location.

(Tr. p. 4 3).

Finally, he testified that the

reasonable amount to rent his building during this period of
time was $200.00 a month based upon comparable rents in the
same area.

(Tr. pp. 194-195).

A simple mathematical calculation

shows that there are 6 0 months between January of 1974 and
January of 1979.

At $200 a month this would be a total rental

of $12,000—not $14,000 as found by the lower court.

Since

Plaintiff was responsible for half of this amount he is
entitled to a $1,000 credit.
In addition, Plaintiff was assessed $6,679 for the rental
of the two base stations between 19 73 to August of 19 81 when
the two stations were removed by the defendant.

This figure

is further broken down into $3,579 from the beginning of the
partnership until its dissolution and $3,021 from the time of
its dissolution until the possession of the stations by the
defendant.

(Tr. pp. 193-194).

Defendant admitted on cross examination that he never
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requested Plaintiff to pay the company a monthly rental for
his building nor did he request a rental for the two base
stations located at the plaintiff's jewelry stores.

None of

these claims were made until after the lawsuit had been filed.
(Tr. pp. 196-199) .
The lower court refused to entertain the defense of laches
raised by Plaintiff's attorney on the basis that it had not been
stated as an affirmative defense in Plaintiff's Reply to
Defendant's Counterclaim.

(Tr. pp. 212-213).

On the other

hand, the doctrine of laches and the statute of limitations
had been raised by the defendant in his Answer.

Defendant's

counsel in closing argument stated:
We have raised in our answers to the defense
the statutes of limitations and laches, and I think
those have some real merit, that the court consider
them. This case sat for a long time, and there has
been arguments about accountings claimed to have
happened in 1972, yet nothing happens until 1981.
The statute of limitations is really hard to tell
when the cause of action arose. Maybe it arose on
January 1 of 1979. If it did it probably did not
run, but laches may be applicable here. (Tr. p. 205).
While admittedly Plaintiff's lower court counsel should
have raised laches in his Reply to the Counterclaim the failure
to do so certainly should not have precluded its application in
this case since it was of no surprise to the defendants that
such a defense existed since both parties were making identical
types of claims and defenses.

This Court recently reaffirmed

the rule that the purpose of Rule 8(c) is to insure that the
parties have adequate notice of the issues and the facts of a
case and not to preclude a valid defense for a technical defect
in the pleadings.

Price Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown &
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Gunnell, Inc., 25 Utah Adv. Rep. 47 (January 9, 1986).

This

Court as early as 1963 recognized that the mere failure to
plead an affirmative defense does not preclude it if there is
no surprise and if the evidence is consistent with such defense.
Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86 (Utah 1963).

There, this Court

noted that Rules 15(b) and 54(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure allow a party the remedy of correcting defective
technical pleadings when there is no prejudice to the opposing
party.

See also, Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690

(Utah 1977); FMA Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 404 P.2d 670
(Utah 1970).
The lower court therefore was incorrect in concluding that
the issue of laches could not be raised by the plaintiff since
it had not been plead in the Reply to the Counterclaim.

Laches

is applicable in this case since there is evidence both as to
the lack of diligence on the part of the defendant and an injury
to the plaintiff owing to such lack of diligence.

Papanikolas

Bros. Enterprises v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center, 535 P.2d 1256
(Utah 1975) . Had Defendant notified Plaintiff at the inception
of the agreement that he was expecting rent for his building
Plaintiff may have found a more suitable building at a lower
cost.

Likewise, had he been informed that he would be paying

for the base stations he may have decided to buy them himself
since the value of the stations is less than the amount of rent
ultimately charged to the plaintiff.

In addition, since this

is a case of equity the principle that equity aids the vigilant
is applicable.

Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976) .
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This principle is even more apparent when the base rental
station is further divided.

After Defendant had unilaterally

decided to terminate the agreement he allowed Plaintiff to
continue to operate the two base stations for over two and a
half years before he finally removed them.

During this period

of time he never informed the plaintiff that he would be charging
him a competitive lease payment nor did he give him any notice
whatsoever that he would be paying for the use of these stations
that he had had in his business operation for some nine years.
For these reasons, therefore, the lower court erred in
computing the amount of rent plaintiff was ultimately liable
for and, further erred in assessing any rent whatsoever.
CONCLUSION
This case illustrates the principle that the best laid
plans of mice and men often go astray.

Both the plaintiff and

the defendant entered into a business relationship for the purpose
of enhancing their financial status.

Neither was concerned about

the legal technicalities of what they called their agreement and
each attempted to assist the other in the operation of the
business.

When the relationship finally broke down the

defendant merely took the practical approach he thought best,
changed names and bank accounts, and continued to run the
operation with the same equipment and inventory.

Again, no

formal dissolution of partnership occurred since Defendant was
not concerned nor aware of the legal requirement for such
dissolution.
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When this action was subsequently filed even the lawyers
in the case viewed the relationship differently.

The issues

were clearly not well framed and the evidence was not presented
by either side in a consistent manner based upon partnership
principles.

It is understandable why the lower court made these

accounting errors since the division of assets and liabilities
was not cohesively presented by either side.
Nevertheless, both parties in this agreement are entitled
to a fair dissolution of their relationship.

This Court with

its equitable powers has a duty to correct the errors of the
lower court relating to the distribution of assets and liabilities.
Clearly, Plaintiff is entitled to a full accounting as to the
market value of all assets of the partnership at the time of its
dissolution regardless of whether such assets have been depreciated
for tax purposes.

Likewise, Plaintiff is entitled to certain

credits discussed above and is further entitled to an accounting
as to what debts have actually been paid by the defendant and
what debts remain unpaid.
Finally, the doctrine of laches was a proper defense in
this matter and should have been allowed by the lower court
even though it had not been pleaded.

Under such doctrine the

claims of Defendant for rents when such claims were never
asserted during the entire tenure of the partnership agreement
should not be allowed.
For the preceding reasons, therefore, it is respectfully
submitted that this matter be remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings in determining a fair and just accounting
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between the parties.
Respectfully submitted this 31st day of March, 1986.

Craig ^ £ook
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies
of the foregoing Brief of Appellants to Gayle McKeachnie
and Clark B. Allred, Attorneys for Defendants - Respondents,
363 East Main Street, Vernal, Utah 84078 this 31st day of
March, 19 86.

ADDENDUM

AG R E E M E N T

This Agreement, made and entered into this c?ci±T~
ls/7'2

day of

L^Mi^LZ^Jr-

by and between R, R. SATHER, hereinafter called "Sather", and

WILLIAM E. PITCHER, Jr., hereinafter called "Pitcher",
WITNESSETH?
1.

That the parties hereto agree to enter into the business of

Television and Electronic repairs and service, and Sather agrees as follows:
a.

To furnish shop from which the business is to be conducted,

b.

To furnish necessary equipment, to operate the business, including
test equipment, and other equipment reasonably necessary to
conduct the same, and to provide for and furnish an inventory
of tubes, parts and other materials that may be required in
the business.

2.

That Pitcher agrees to spend his full time and effort in the

said business and to whatever he can to secure business and to operate the
business in a good and workmanlike manner.
3.

That it is agreed that the business shall be owned by Sather,

that Pitcher is to be compensated for his services as follows:
a.

To receive &07. of all of the labor and 20% of all of the
parts and materials used in connection with radio and television
repairs and service.

b.

To receive 60% of the labor and 10% of all parts and materials
used In the service and operation of the Communications part of
the business.

4.

That Sather shalalfurnish a suitable service truck for use in

the said business, it is agreed that time for the service truck, while on
business purposes shall be billed to customers at the rate of .35c per mile,
with Pitcher to receive the sum of .15c per mile, and the sum of .20 cents
per mile to go for truck expenses and maintenance*
5.

That in the event that Pitcher does repair and service work

for gather in connection with Sather Jewely Company, then such work shall be
billed to Sather at the regular shop and service call rates.
6.

That it is agreed that at least monthly, an accounting shall

be had, both as to labor and for parts.
7.

That it is hereby agreed that Pitcher will pay his own

social security, income tax, and workmans compensation, and that Sather shall
not be responsible for the same.
- I -

8.

That the said Pitcher shall have the option during the term

of this agreement to purchase the entire business, the purchase price shall
be determined on the basis of the eoet of equipment, less depreciation,
plus all of the Inventory of parts, tubes, supplies, etc.
9.

That It Is agreed that all of the expenses of the business,

rent, utilities, taxes and other necessary business expenses shall be
deducted before a division Is made of the proceeds M set forth In paragraph
3, hereof.
10.

That work done for Satber Jewelry, set forth In paragraph 5,

hereof, all parts and materlale used shall be at wholesale coat of the same.
11.

That It Is agreed that this agreement may be terminated by

either of the parties at any time, that upon termination It la agreed that
as accounting In full shall be had between the parties within three (3)
days after such termination*
12.

That all of the bills, Invoicing and "paper work" In connection

with the buslues shall be the responsibility of Pitcher.
WITNESS the hands of the parties hereto this

day of

, 1972.

R. R. Sather

William E. Pitcher, Jr.
WITNESS:

8.

That it is agreed that thlaaagreement may be terminated by

either of the parties at any time, that upon termination it la agreed that
an accounting In full shall be had between the parties within three (4) days
after such termination.
9«

That all of the bills,, Invoicing and "paper work1' in connection

with the business shall be the responsibility of Pitcher,
WITNESS the hands of the parties hereto this
—

day of

, 1972.

R. R. Sether

William E. Pitcher, Jr.
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TYPED REPRODUCTION OF HANDWRITTEN NOTES APPEARING
ON BACK OF PAGE 3 OF EXHIBIT 2.

"Purchase option" buy (blue ink)
Business expenses to go taken off the top at 50-50 rent and
utilities and taxes of profits before draw (blue ink)
Change 3 to partnership (black ink)
Store services charge parts only at wholesale cost (blue ink)
Okay agreement as listed above and front two pages
ss/ R. R. Sather (blue ink)
William Pitcher 7-1-72 (black ink)

1

THE CLERK:

2

MR. ALLRED:

3

THE CLERK:

4

MR. ALLRED:

5

THE CLERK:

6

HOW ABOUT 35?
35 AND 26, NEITHER ONE WERE.
35 OR 26?
MY RECORD SHOWS THAT.
26 WAS OFFERED AND RECEIVED.

IT'S A

LETTER.
MR. ALLRED:

7
8

DIDN'T THINK IT HAD.

9

THE COURT:

I BETTER GIVE IT BACK TO YOU.

I

WAS THE '82 TAX RETURNS EVER OFFERED?

10

MR. ALLRED:

11

THE COURT:

WE TALKED ABOUT IT A LOT.

12

THE CLERK:

YES.

14

THE COURT:

OKAY.

15

THE CLERK:

I HAVE THE DOCUMENT HERE.

16

THE COURT:

35 I DO NOT HAVE OFFERED.

17

THE CLERK:

I DON'T, EITHER.

18

THE COURT:

WELL, WE HAVE GOT THE HOUSEKEEPING DONE.

19

THIS MATTER BOILS DOWN TO A QUESTION OF WHO DO I

13

YES.

I HAVE IT AS OFFERED AND

RECEIVED.
RECEIVED, THEN.

20

BELIEVE.

21

SHIP OR WE HAVE A PROPRIETORSHIP.

22

EXHIBIT NO. 2, AND THOSE FOUR LITTLE WORDS, AS COUNSEL POINTS

23

OUT, WHETHER ORNOT THE COURT CHOOSES TO ACCEPT THOSE OR NOT

24

ACCEPT THOSE.

25

AND SUFFICIENCY AND CREDIBILITY OF THE TESTIMONY.

IT REALLY BOILS DOWN TO WHETHER WE HAVE A PARTNERIT REALLY BOILS DOWN TO

WHAT THAT COMES DOWN TO IS A QUESTION OF WEIGHT
I INSTRUCT
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1

J U R I E S A B O U T T H I S , AND P E R H A P S WE PAY M O R E A T T E N T I O N TO

2

W H E N A JURY

3

FACT THE SAME AS THE JURY, AND THE COURT HAS TO

4

W H E T H E R OR NOT THERE IS A D E Q U A T E W E I G H T , A D E Q U A T E

5

AND W H E T H E R OR NOT THE W I T N E S S E S ARE C R E D I B L E .

6

IS P R E S E N T .

H O W E V E R , THE COURT

IT

IS THE FINDER OF
DETERMINE
SUFFICIENCY.

IN DOING SO I ASK THE F O L L O W I N G Q U E S T I O N S OF MYSELF.

7

A N D I W R O T E T H E S E DOWN.

8

TO MAKE AN A G R E E M E N T W I T H THE D E F E N D A N T ?

9

FOR HIM ON THE SAME TERMS HE T E S T I F I E D .

10

T E S T I F I E D TO T H A T .

11

MENT?

12

F I R S T , WHY DID THE P L A I N T I F F
HE HAD HIM
I THINK

BOTHER
WORKING

BOTH

WHY WAS T H E R E ANY NEED TO MAKE AN A G R E E -

S E C O N D OF A L L IF THE D E F E N D A N T

IS A M E R E

EMPLOYEE

13

WHY WAS HE R E Q U I R E D TO MAKE ANY KIND OF AN A C C O U N T I N G ?

14

CONFUSES ME.

15

NOW,

IT WAS VERY C A R E F U L L Y

DONE

16

TO E X C L U D E THE PAYMENT OF ANY E M P L O Y E E C O S T S , P L A C I N G

THAT

17

BURDEN OVER UPON THE D E F E N D A N T , MR. P I T C H E R .

18

T Y P E OF A G R E E M E N T , W H I C H ONE SIDE SAYS

19

A G R E E M E N T , W O U L D T H E R E BE A B U Y - O U T P R O V I S I O N ?

20 " S I S T E N T .

IN THE A G R E E M E N T

IT

IS AN

WHY

IN THIS

EMPLOYMENT
IT'S

IF T H E R E WAS A BUY-OUT A G R E E M E N T WHY WAS

INCON-

IT R E F U S E D

21

WHY WERE THE TERMS

IN ITEM 27 SO O N E - S I D E D THAT THEY

WERE

22

I M P O S S I B L E TO MEET?

23

ARE Q U O T E S FROM T E S T I M O N Y , OR NEAR Q U O T E S .

24

B U S I N E S S LEFT UP TO THE D E F E N D A N T ?

25

O N E TIME WHEN THE Q U E S T I O N WAS MADE ABOUT HIS P R O M I S S O R Y NOTE'

WHY WAS ALL THE BUSINESS — SOME OF T H E S E
WHY WAS A L L THE

MR. SATHER

MENTIONED
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1

THAT THAT WAS ONLY W H E N WE WENT TO GET SURVIVOR'S

2

SURVIVOR'S

3

EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP.

4

SIGN P R O M I S S O R Y N O T E S .

5

BOTHER?

6

INSURANCE

IS A B S O L U T E L Y

INSURANCE.

INCONSISTENT WITH AN

D E F E N D A N T WAS R E Q U I R E D TO

IF HE WAS AN E M P L O Y E E WHY SHOULD HE

THEY W O U L D N ' T BE HIS O B L I G A T I O N

WHATSOEVER.

THEN T H E R E WERE FOUR OR FIVE STATEMENTS THAT

WELL

7

IN THE D E P O S I T I O N THE R E P O R T E R MUST HAVE MADE A M I S T A K E .

8

IT WAS SWORN T O .

9

S T A T E M E N T S UNDER O A T H .

THE COURT FOUND NUMEROUS

INCONSISTENT

THE COURT D I S C O V E R E D T E S T I M O N Y

10

KEPT CHANGING A LITTLE BIT UNDER O A T H .

11

T E S T I M O N Y O F F E R E D BY MR. SATHER TO BE W O R T H LITTLE TO

12

WHICH

THE COURT FINDS THE
BELIEVE.

IT A P P E A R S TO ME THAT W H A T WE A T T E M P T E D TO GET H E R E ,

13

W H A T THE TRUTH REALLY

14

W I T H FINDING, W H A T WE REALLY A C Q U I R E D HERE

15

FOUND H I M S E L F A REAL NICE TAX W R I T E O F F AND HE FOUND A MAN

16

OVER HERE WHO WAS SUCKER ENOUGH TO WORK FOR N O T H I N G .

17

W H A T IT BOILS DOWN T O .

18

YET

IS H E R E , AND THAT'S WHAT I'M
IS MR.

IN REGARD TO MR. C A S P E R S O N ' S T E S T I M O N Y ,

CHARGED
SATHER

THAT'S

I THINK

19

MR. C A S P E R S O N T E S T I F I E D AS H O N E S T L Y AND T R U T H F U L L Y

20

O P E N L Y AS HE POSSIBLY C O U L D .

21

CERTAIN RECORDS.

22

N O B O D Y KNOWS

23

THEY HAD BEEN OUT OF S T A T E .

24

WHAT H A P P E N E D TO THOSE R E C O R D S , AND AS A RESULT I CAN GIVE

25

HIS T E S T I M O N Y LITTLE C R E D E N C E , BY HIS OWN

BUT HE WAS ONLY

HE D O E S N ' T KNOW

IF THEY ARE C O M P L E T E .

AND

FURNISHED

IF THEY WERE C O M P L E T E .
THEY A R E FOUR YEARS O L D .

SHIPPED A R O U N D .

WE DON'T

KNOW

TESTIMONY.
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1

BASED UPON WHAT I HAVE HEARD HERE TODAY, BASED

2

UPON WHAT IS IN THE FILE, WITH THE TWO WRITS OF REPLEVIN,

3

WITH THE IMPROPER FILING IN THE WRONG COUNTY, WITH ALL THE

4

OTHER INCONSISTENCIES AND PROBLEMS THAT WE HAVE IN THIS

5

CASE, THE COURT FINDS AS FOLLOWS:

6
7

NUMBER

1, THE PARTIES ENTERED INTO A PARTNERSHIP

AGREEMENT AS OF JANUARY

8

MR. ALLRED:

9

THE COURT:

10

1, 1973, I BELIEVE IT WAS.
T

72.

EXCUSE ME.

BASED UPON THAT PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT THERE HAS

11

BEEN A BREACH IN THAT THE PLAINTIFF, MR. SATHER, FAILED TO

12

LIVE UP TO THE TERMS OF HIS AGREEMENT.

13
14
15

THERE WAS A SUBSEQUENT BREACH WHEN THE DEFENDANT
TOOK THE EQUIPMENT AND STARTED USING IT AT HIS OWN BUSINESS.
CONSEQUENTLY,

I GRANT JUDGMENT AS FOLLOWS.

FOR

16

THE RENTS FOR THE BASE STATIONS OWED TO THE PARTNERSHIP, FOR

17

THE AMOUNT OWED ON RADIO AND TELEVISION REPAIRS AND FOR THE

18

RENT ON THE BUILDINGS, ONE-HALF OF THAT, WHICH IS MR.

19

SATHER'S SHARE, WHICH HE OWES $10,716.86.

20

FEES IN THE SUM OF $480.00, MAKING A FINDING THAT YES

21

THERE WAS AN ABUSE OF PROCESS

22

HOWEVER,

I AWARD

ATTORNEY
INDEED

IN THIS CASE.

I THINK THAT MR. SATHER

IS ENTITLED TO

23

ONE-HALF OF THE VALUE OF THE ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT AND THAT

24

ACQUIRED, PLUS THE INVENTORY.

TESTIMONY HAS BEEN THE EQUIP-

25

MENT WAS TOTALLY DEPRECIATED.

INVENTORY WAS

APPROXIMATELY
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THAT AMOUNTS TO ONE-HALF OF THAT OR $6,500.
IT'S ALSO BEEN TESTIFIED TO SEVERAL TIMES MR.
WANTED TO TAKE THESE WRITEOFFS ON HIS TAX RETURN.

FOR

ASON I'M ALSO GRANTING JUDGMENT IN THE SUM OF $6,000.00
DEFENDANT FOR THE LOSSES WHICH MR. SATHER FAILED TO
I'M CONFIDENT TOOK OFF ON HIS OWN TAX RETURNS.

I

THAT TOTALS $10,696.88 FOR THE DEFENDANT, TOGETHER
URT COSTS.
ANY QUESTIONS?
MR. ALLRED:
THE COURT:

THAT CAME TO TEN THOUSAND—
$10,696.88, IF MY FIGURES ARE CORRECT,

f80.
MR. ALLRED:

THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

I'LL PREPARE

JS AND A JUDGMENT ACCORDINGLY.
CWHEREUPON THIS HEARING WAS CONCLUDED.)
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FILED
DISTRICT COURT

OCT 81235

CLARK B. ALLRED
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Defendants
363 East Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: (801) 789-4908

QOnUtnt u u ^

— *
(DEPUTY
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
R.R. SATHER and R.R. SATHER
dba SATHERS COMMUNICATIONS
ELECTRONICS and COMMUNICATIONS
ELECTRONICS,

]
]
)

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
vs.
WILLIAM E. PITCHER, JR.,
PITCHER COMMUNICATION
ELECTRONICS, a corporation,
DWIGHT PITCHER, VERNA PITCHER
and JOHN DOES ONE and TWO,

1
'
Civil No. 11,156

Defendants.

The above captioned matter came before the Court for trial
on September 16, 1985, at 9:30 a.m.
present

and

represented

by

his

Plaintiff, R.R. Sather, was
attorney,

Anthony

Famulary.

Defendant, William E. Pitcher, Jr., was present and represented
by his attorney, Clark B. Allred.

The other Defendants have

filed bankruptcy and notice of the bankruptcy filing is contained
within the file.

Testimony from various witnesses, together with

documentary evidence was received by the Court and the Court
being fully advised and having heard the testimony and examined
the evidence produced and after argument by counsel hereby enters

the following Findings of Fact.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff,

R.R.

Sather,

and

Defendant, William

E.

Pitcher, Jr., entered into an agreement dated January 1, 1972.
The agreement is Exhibit No. 2.
2.

One of the major issues before the Court is whether the

agreement created a partnership as claimed by the Defendant or
was

a

sole

proprietorship

arrangement

as

claimed

by

the

Plaintiff.
3.

A determination of the issues in this case is primarily

dependent

upon

Defendant.

the

Based

creditability
on

the

of

the

demeanor

of

Plaintiff
the

and

the

Plaintiff, the

inconsistent statements, the responses given on the witness stand
and the positions taken by the Plaintiff, the Court finds that
little

creditability

should

be

given

to

the

Plaintiff's

testimony.
4.

The agreement of the parties, together with the actions

of the parties, are more consistent with the arrangement being a
partnership rather than a sole proprietorship.

The Court finds

that the facts are more consistent with the arrangement being a
partnership.
written

Those facts include the preparing and signing of a

agreement

relationship,

a

which

is

unusual

requirement

accounting,

the

provision

Plaintiff's

response

to

that

for

a

the

/3>

an

employer/employee

Defendant

buy-out

Defendant's
2

in

by

proposed

the

provide

an

Defendant,

buy-out,

the

discussion

regarding

survivorship

Defendant was responsible

insurance,

for the work

the

and the

fact

that

inconsistent

statements of the Plaintiff regarding what the arrangement was
together with express language contained on the back of Exhibit
2.
5.

The Court received testimony regarding an accounting

provided by the Plaintiff and an accounting provided by the
Defendant•
Plaintiff
undisputed

The Court finds that the accounting provided by the
can be

given

very

little

weight

in

that

it was

that not all documents had been examined by the

accountant, cash disbursements for expenses were not included and
the records relied on by Plaintiff's accountant had not been in
the possession of the accountantf but for three years had been in
the possession

of an accounting

firm

in California with no

explanation given as to whether any documents had been removed,
lost, changed or altered.
6.

The

Plaintiff

breached

the

terms

of

the

parties

agreement dated January 1, 1972, by his failure to provide a
shop, to pay for personal repair and service work or to provide a
truck or other equipment.

In general the Plaintiff basically

ignored the terms of the parties agreement.
7.

Defendant generally

complied with the terms of the

agreement until December 31, 1978, at which time he terminated
the agreement by starting a new business entity.
8.

When Defendant terminated the business on December 31,
3

n-i

1978, Plaintiff was entitled to receive one-half of the value of
the assets at that time.

The assets of the partnership on

December 31, 1978, included equipment which was fully depreciated
and had no value and inventory of approximately $13,000.00.
9.

At the time the partnership was terminated on December

31, 1978, Plaintiff was also responsible for one-half of the
losses

and

operating

debts

of

expenses

the

during

partnership
the

term

which

of

the

losses

included

partnership, tax

liabilities, tax benefits received by the Plaintiff and not by
the

Defendant

and

interest

for

a

total

loss

of

at

least

$12,000.00.
10.

Plaintiff,

pursuant

to

the

parties

agreement, was

responsible to provide a building for use of the partnership.
The

Plaintiff

failed

to

provide

that

building

Defendant was required to provide the building.

and

so

the

A reasonable

rent for the building was $200.00 per month for a total rental of
$14,000.00.
11.

Plaintiff used, during the term of the partnership and

even after the partnership was terminated, two base stations
which belong to the partnership.

Plaintiff had agreed to pay a

reasonable rental for those base stations, but failed to do so.
A reasonable rental for those base stations during the time
period they were in the Plaintiff's possession was $6,600.79.
12.

Plaintiff had agreed to pay the partnership for any

repairs made to equipment owned by the Plaintiff.
4
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Plaintiff

incurred repair expenses of $832.98 which he has failed to pay.
13.
parties

The
as

Plaintiff

a means

treated

whereby

he

the

arrangement

could

claim

between

the

substantial

tax

benefits without incurring any work or expense and requiring the
Defendant to do all the work and incur the expense which is
contrary to the terms of the party's agreement.
14.

In Augustf

1981, Plaintiff

signed an Affidavit and

Judge Bullock, relying on the Affidavit, issued a Pre-judgment
Writ of Replevin

and an Order

to Show Cause

requiring

the

Defendant to appear before the Court on August 24, 1981.

The

Plaintiff, when signing the Affidavit under oath, had no facts
which showed immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage and
there was no basis for the issuance of the Pre-judgment Writ
without notice to the Defendant.
15.

Defendant, on being served with the Pre-judgment Writ

of Replevin and the Order to Show Cause, appeared before the
Court on August 24, 1981.

Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel

appeared at that time and therefore the Writ was dismissed.
16.

In September, 1981, the Plaintiff signed an identical

Affidavit and presented the same to a different Judge, Judge Sam,
to obtain another Pre-judgment Writ of Replevin.

No notice was

given to the Defendant or his counsel of the Writ.

The Plaintiff

had no facts to support his claim of immediate and irreparable
injury.
17.

Pursuant to the Order to Show Cause which accompanied
5
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the second Writ of Replevin, the Defendant again appeared before
the Court and the Court

found at that time that venue was

improper and ordered the case transferred to Uintah County, Utah.
18.

Defendant, to avoid

other

continued

legal hassels,

agreed to file a bond guaranteeing that the two base stations
would be available in the event the Court ruled that Plaintiff
was entitled to the same.
19.

Defendant incurred legal fees in the amount of $480.00

contesting the two Writs of Replevin.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the preceding Findings of Fact, the Court makes the
following Conclusions of Laws.
1.

Plaintiff,

R.R.

Sather,

and

Defendant, William

E.

Pitcher, Jr., entered into a partnership whereby they were to
split expenses, profits and losses 50-50.

That partnership had a

term beginning January 1, 1972 and terminated on December 31,
1978.
2.

The testimony of Plaintiff, Sather, is to be given

little credence.
3.

The accounting provided by Plaintiff, Sather, is to be

given little credence.
4.

The

accounting

of

the

partnership

shows

that

the

Plaintiff owes to Defendant the sum of $6000.00 as his 50% share
of the loss of the business and $10,716.88 for Plaintiff's 50%
share for the rent of the building, the base stations and repairs
6

which Plaintiff had failed to pay to the partnership.
5.

Defendant owes to Plaintiff the sum of $6,500.00 for

Plaintiff's 50% share of the assets of the partnership.
6.

The obtaining of the two Pre-judgment Writs of Replevin

by the Plaintiff was in violation of Rule 6 4A of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, was done intentionally without notice and
with malice and Defendant incurred damages of $480.00 in legal
fees as a result of the wrongful actions of the Plaintiff.
7.

When amounts owed by the Defendant to Plaintiff is

deducted from the amount owed by Plaintiff to Defendant, the
resulting balance that Plaintiff owes to Defendant is the sum of
$10,696.88 for which Defendant is entitled to judgment.
DATED this y

day of September, 1985.
*

Richard C. Davidson
District Judge

i_'

FILED
DISTRICT COURT

OCT 3 1985
BY.

DEDUTY

CLARK B. ALLRED
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Defendants
363 East Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: (801) 789-4908
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
R.R. SATHER and R.R. SATHER
dba SATHERS COMMUNICATIONS
ELECTRONICS and COMMUNICATIONS
ELECTRONICS,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,

% 330

vs.
WILLIAM E. PITCHER, JR.,
PITCHER COMMUNICATION
ELECTRONICS, a corporation,
DWIGHT PITCHER, VERNA PITCHER
and JOHN DOES ONE and TWO,
Defendants.

C i v i l No.

11,156

The above captioned matter having come before the Court on
September 16, 1985, for trial and the Court having entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and being fully advised,
hereby;
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that:
1.

Defendant, William

E. Pitcher, Jr., have

judgment

against Plaintiff, R.R. Sather, in the amount of $10,696.88,
together with costs.
2. The undertaking previously filed herein on behalf of the

/ > - /

Defendant regarding the base stations is hereby discharged,
DATED this /

day of-September, 19 85.
Richard C. Davidson
District Judge
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